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Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2017

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Abstract

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We model and test the relations between the team management of mutual funds, managers’ ability, performance, and holdings. Our model predicts that team-managed funds perform better and behave more conservatively than single-manager funds. However, the effect of team management is masked in equilibrium because high-ability managers rationally self-select into single-manager funds. Consistent with the model’s prediction, we find that team-managed funds perform better and deviate less from their benchmark allocations than single-manager funds with the same characteristics. These differences are marked after we control for the endogenous self-selection of managers.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2017 
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