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Indirect Insider Trading

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2022

Brad Goldie
Affiliation:
Miami University Farmer School of Business goldieba@miamioh.edu
Chao Jiang
Affiliation:
University of South Carolina Darla Moore School of Business chao.jiang@moore.sc.edu
Paul Koch*
Affiliation:
Iowa State University Ivy College of Business
M. Babajide Wintoki
Affiliation:
University of Kansas School of Business jwintoki@ku.edu
*
pkoch@iastate.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Insiders must disclose indirect trades made through accounts they control, including family, trust, retirement, and foundation accounts. Indirect trades through these accounts are more profitable than direct trades in the insider’s own account. They are also more likely to be made by “opportunistic” insiders who make nonroutine trades, or who trade profitably before earnings announcements, or who have a short investment horizon. These trades contain more predictive information about earnings surprises and large price changes, and they tend to be made by insiders at firms with high information asymmetry. Insiders also make fewer indirect trades following periods of intense regulatory scrutiny.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

Goldie et al. supplementary material

Goldie et al. supplementary material

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