Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-lpg2g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T20:01:44.895Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Individual Commitment and Team Performance: Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2019

Jiang Luo
Affiliation:
Luo, luojiang@ntu.edu.sg, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University
Zheng Qiao*
Affiliation:
Qiao, zqiao@xmu.edu.cn, School of Management, Xiamen University
*
Qiao (corresponding author), zqiao@xmu.edu.cn
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

The psychology literature suggests that individual commitment has a positive effect on team performance by mitigating the free-rider problem. With its detailed management-team information, the mutual fund industry provides a unique opportunity to study how individual managerial commitment is related to performance. Committed fund managers are defined as those who work only for one fund. With few incentives to acquire private information, teams with no committed members underperform those with committed members. These findings remain robust after we incorporate various controls. We also explore why non-committed teams have been used increasingly often despite their poor performance.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019
Supplementary material: File

Luo and Qiao supplementary material

Luo and Qiao supplementary material

Download Luo and Qiao supplementary material(File)
File 176.2 KB