Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T21:10:50.674Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Information Asymmetry and the Sinking Fund Provision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Abstract

This paper examines the signalling implications of sinking funds and shows that under information asymmetry the sinking fund amortization rate provides a credible signal for the quality of the firm. In a separating equilibrium, better quality firms choose higher sinking fund amortization rates in their bond issues. A latent index model is proposed for testing the hypothesis of sinking fund signalling. Empirical evidence indicates that the sinking fund amortization rate signals the credit quality of the firm.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable