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Informational Efficiency of Cryptocurrency Markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 April 2024

Mahendrarajah Nimalendran
Affiliation:
University of Florida Warrington College of Business mahen.nimalendran@warrington.ufl.edu
Praveen Pathak
Affiliation:
University of Florida Warrington College of Business praveen.pathak@warrington.ufl.edu
Mariia Petryk*
Affiliation:
George Mason University Donald G. Costello College of Business
Liangfei Qiu
Affiliation:
University of Florida Warrington College of Business liangfei.qiu@warrington.ufl.edu
*
mpetryk@gmu.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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This study employs variance ratios (VRs) to assess the roles of regulation and liquidity on cryptocurrency market efficiency, focusing on crypto-assets subject to varying degrees of regulation. Our findings reveal that cryptocurrencies supervised by FinCEN-licensed exchanges (IEO-L) exhibit market efficiency similar to SEC-regulated traditional stock offerings (IPOs). Conversely, noncompliant crypto-assets display higher market inefficiency. We also establish a connection between regulatory compliance and issuing entity reputation mechanisms. Our results indicate that compliance with existing regulatory norms enhances efficiency and reduces investor risks in crypto-assets. Furthermore, assets voluntarily adhering to regulatory norms can attain efficiency akin to government-regulated assets.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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