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Innovation Under Pressure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 May 2024

Heitor Almeida*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Gies College of Business and NBER
Vyacheslav Fos
Affiliation:
Boston College Carroll School of Management, NBER, Centre for Economic Policy Research, and European Corporate Governance Institute fos@bc.edu
Po-Hsuan Hsu
Affiliation:
National Tsing Hua University College of Technology Management pohsuanhsu@mx.nthu.edu.tw
Mathias Kronlund
Affiliation:
Tulane University Freeman School of Business mkronlund@tulane.edu
Kevin Tseng
Affiliation:
Chinese University of Hong Kong School of Business and National Taiwan University College of Management kevintseng@cuhk.edu.hk
*
halmeida@illinois.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Firms become more efficient at innovation activities when they face pressure to meet earnings per share (EPS) targets using stock repurchases. Using a regression-discontinuity framework, we find that incentives to engage in “EPS-motivated buybacks” are followed by more citations and higher values for firms’ new patents. We trace these effects to improved allocation of R&D resources and a greater focus on novel innovation. The positive effects are concentrated among ex ante “innovation-efficient” firms that achieve better patenting outcomes after reorganizing (but not cutting) their R&D investments. Our findings illustrate that short-term earnings pressure can act through a free cash flow channel that motivates more efficient spending.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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