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Insider Trading: What Really Protects U.S. Investors?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2019

Roger M. White*
Affiliation:
White, roger.white@asu.edu, Arizona State University W. P. Carey School of Business
*
White (corresponding author), roger.white@asu.edu
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Abstract

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I examine the ability of the U.S. investor protection regime to limit insider trading returns, absent Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the short-swing rule). I find that in this setting, U.S. insiders execute short-swing trades that i) beat the market by approximately 15 basis points per day and ii) systematically divest ahead of disappointing earnings announcements. These results indicate that the bright-line rule restricting short-horizon round-trip insider trading plays a substantial role in protecting outside investors from privately informed insiders in the United States.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019