Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T13:26:20.449Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Institutional Debtholder Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2020

Aneel Keswani
Affiliation:
City University of London Cass Business School a.keswani@city.ac.uk
Anh Tran
Affiliation:
City University of London Cass Business School anh.tran@city.ac.uk
Paolo Volpin*
Affiliation:
City University of London Cass Business School
*
paolo.volpin.1@city.ac.uk (corresponding author)
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Using data on the universe of U.S. based mutual funds, we find that two out of five fund families hold corporate bonds of firms in which they also own an equity stake. We show that the greater the fraction of debt a fund family holds in a given firm, the greater its propensity to vote in line with the interests of firm debtholders at shareholder meetings, even when against Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendation. Voting has direct policy consequences as firms that receive more votes in favor of creditors make corporate decisions more in line with the interests of debtholders.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington