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Judge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 February 2024

Allen H. Huang
Affiliation:
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, School of Business and Management allen.huang@ust.hk
Kai Wai Hui*
Affiliation:
University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Business and Economics
Yue Zheng
Affiliation:
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, School of Business and Management aczheng@ust.hk
*
kaiwai@hku.hk (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Although federal judges are the ultimate arbiters of insider trading enforcement, the role of their political ideology in insider trading is unclear. Using the partisanship of judges’ nominating presidents to measure judge ideology, we first document that liberal judges are associated with heavier penalties in insider trading lawsuits than conservative judges. Next, we find that firms located in circuits with more liberal judges have fewer opportunistic insider sales. Cross-sectional analyses show that this deterrent effect is stronger when managers face a higher risk of insider trading lawsuits. Finally, we find that the Securities and Exchange Commission considers judges’ ideology when selecting litigation forums.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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