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Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2020

Marco Macchiavelli*
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Board
Luke Pettit
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Board luke.pettit@frb.gov
*
marco.macchiavelli@frb.gov (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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The liquidity-coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand a 30-day run. We study the effects of the LCR on broker-dealers, the financial intermediaries at the epicenter of the 2007–2009 crisis. The LCR brings some financial-stability benefits, including a significant maturity extension of triparty repos backed by lower-quality collateral, as well as the accumulation of larger liquidity pools. However, it also leads to less liquidity transformation by broker-dealers. We also discuss the liquidity risks not addressed by the LCR. Finally, we show that a major source of fire-sale risk was self-corrected before the introduction of postcrisis regulations.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington