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Managerial Entrenchment and Information Production

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 September 2019

Chen Lin
Affiliation:
Lin, chenlin1@hku.hk, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Business and Economics
Lai Wei
Affiliation:
Wei, laiwei2@ln.edu.hk, Lingnan University Faculty of Business
Wensi Xie*
Affiliation:
Xie, wensixie@cuhk.edu.hk, Chinese University of Hong Kong Business School
*
Xie (corresponding author), wensixie@cuhk.edu.hk
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Abstract

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In this article, we evaluate the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate information production using the voting outcomes of shareholder-initiated proposals intended to mitigate managerial entrenchment. We focus on the proposals that are passed or rejected by a small margin of votes, which generate plausibly exogenous variations in managerial entrenchment. We find that a reduction in managerial entrenchment enhances corporate information production. The effects are stronger for firms with greater information asymmetries and severer agency frictions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that reducing managerial entrenchment enhances corporate disclosure by aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019