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Managerial Trustworthiness and Buybacks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2021

Sterling Huang*
Affiliation:
Singapore Management University
Kaisa Snellman
Affiliation:
INSEAD kaisa.snellman@insead.edu
Theo Vermaelen
Affiliation:
INSEAD and ECGI theo.vermaelen@insead.edu
*
shuang@smu.edu.sg (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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CEO trustworthiness is positively related to long-term excess returns after buyback announcements. When the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is trustworthy, statements that the stock is undervalued are more credible. CEO trustworthiness is initially measured by the extent to which people in the county where the company headquarters is located trust each other. Further, the positive impact of trustworthiness on excess returns is higher when the CEO has been a long-term resident of a high-trust county, and correspondingly, trustworthy CEOs are less likely to be accused of financial misreporting. Our conclusions are confirmed when we use alternative measures of trustworthiness such as employee trust and CEO integrity.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington