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Network Centrality and Managerial Market-Timing Ability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2021

Theodoros Evgeniou
Affiliation:
INSEAD theodoros.evgeniou@insead.edu
Joel Peress
Affiliation:
INSEAD joel.peress@insead.edu
Theo Vermaelen*
Affiliation:
INSEAD
Ling Yue
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore ling.yue@insead.edu
*
theo.vermaelen@insead.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We document that long-run excess returns following announcements of share buyback authorizations and insider purchases are a U-shaped function of firm centrality in the input–output trade-flow network. These results conform to a model of investors endowed with a large but finite capacity for analyzing firms. Additional links weaken insiders’ informational advantage in peripheral firms (simple firms whose cash flows depend on few economic links), provided investors’ capacity is large enough, but eventually amplify that advantage in central firms (firms with many links) as a result of investors’ limited capacity. These findings shed light on the sources of managerial market-timing ability.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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Evgeniou et al. supplementary material

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