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Peer Versus Pure Benchmarks in the Compensation of Mutual Fund Managers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2023

Richard Evans
Affiliation:
University of Virginia Darden School of Business evansr@darden.virginia.edu
Juan-Pedro Gómez
Affiliation:
IE University IE Business School juanp.gomez@ie.edu
Linlin Ma*
Affiliation:
Peking University HSBC Business School
Yuehua Tang
Affiliation:
University of Florida Warrington College of Business yuehua.tang@warrington.ufl.edu
*
linlin.ma@phbs.pku.edu.cn (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We examine the role of peer (e.g., Lipper manager indices) versus pure (e.g., S&P 500) benchmarks in fund manager compensation. We model their impact on manager incentives and then test those predictions using novel data. We find that 71% of managers are compensated based on peer benchmarks. Consistent with the model, peer-benchmarked fund managers exhibit higher effort generating higher gross performance and collect higher fee income. Analyzing advisors’ choice between benchmark types, we show that peer-benchmarking advisors cater to more sophisticated and performance-sensitive investors, and are more likely to sell through direct channels, consistent with investor heterogeneity and market segmentation.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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