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Predatory Lending and Hidden Risks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2025

Sumit Agarwal
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore
Gene Amromin
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Itzhak Ben-David*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University and NBER
Douglas D. Evanoff
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Kaufman Financial Policy Center at Loyola University Chicago
*
ben-david.1@osu.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We study a specific practice of predatory lending: Borrowers being rejected and approved in rapid succession by the same lender. We show that in such cases borrower and contract characteristics and ex post performance are consistent with predatory steering. Steered borrowers are associated with groups with lower financial sophistication. They are more likely to enter non-amortizing contracts with high profit margins that are quickly securitized. Steered borrowers default less in boom years when refinancing is easy. However, their performance deteriorates sharply once falling prices trap them in contracts with rising payments, reflecting the long-term costs of predatory lending.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington