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Recruiting the CEO from the Board: Determinants and Consequences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2018

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Abstract

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We investigate an increasingly prevalent CEO succession strategy: recruiting CEOs from the board of directors (director–CEOs). Director–CEOs might be hired in a planned succession because they combine outsiders’ new perspectives with insiders’ firm-specific knowledge. Alternatively, directors may be recruited when the board is unprepared for a leadership change. We find that unplanned successions, in which director–CEOs are appointed as a “quick-fix” solution, result in a negative market reaction, deterioration in performance, and ill-fitting candidates with shorter tenures. Conversely, firms recruiting director–CEOs in planned successions perform similarly to other firms. We find no evidence that poor firm quality drives these results.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018