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Regulating Commission-Based Financial Advice: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 August 2022

Stanislav Sokolinski*
Affiliation:
Rutgers Business School – Newark and New Brunswick, Department of Finance & Economics ssokolinski@business.rutgers.edu
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Abstract

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Do limitations on commissions paid to financial advisers reduce prices of financial products and stimulate investment? I examine these questions by estimating the causal effects of regulating commissions for mutual fund distribution. I exploit the unique institutional setting in Israel and the 2013 policy change when the government reduced commissions differently for different fund types. The reform led to a major decline in fund expense ratios and a consequent increase in fund flows. Funds with price-sensitive investors experienced 35% larger inflows. I interpret these results as investor responses to price competition fostered by a reduction in distribution costs.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

Sokolinski supplementary material

Online Appendix

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