Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T15:31:46.278Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A Rent-Protection Explanation for SEO Flotation-Method Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 July 2016

Xueping Wu*
Affiliation:
efxpwu@cityu.edu.hk, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Zheng Wang
Affiliation:
wangzheng8@gjzq.com.cn, Sinolink Securities Co. Limited, Beijing 100033, PR China
Jun Yao
Affiliation:
afyaojun@polyu.edu.hk, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, School of Accounting and Finance, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
*
*Corresponding author: efxpwu@cityu.edu.hk
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

We model how a rent-protection motive drives the choice of flotation method in new equity issuance between two polar cases: rights issues and cash offers. Unexpected new blockholders would emerge in control-diluting cash offers and share in jealously guarded control benefits. But rights issues help the incumbent controlling shareholders avoid control dilution and safeguard their private benefits. Under asymmetric information about private benefits, the choice of flotation method can convey information about hidden private benefits and hence firm value. Our model can explain even a negative announcement effect of rights issues, and it supports not just one but three important equilibriums.

Information

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2016