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Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Social Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2022

Steven Freund
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts Lowell Manning School of Business steven_freund@uml.edu
Nam H. Nguyen
Affiliation:
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Vackar College of Business & Entrepreneurship namhoang.nguyen@utrgv.edu
Hieu V. Phan*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts Lowell Manning School of Business
*
hieu_phan@uml.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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This research examines the relation between shareholder litigation and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Exploiting exogenous changes in shareholder litigation rights following the staggered adoption of universal demand laws by U.S. states and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling on securities class action lawsuits, we show that weaker shareholder litigation rights lead to lower CSR scores. Moreover, the relation is stronger for firms facing higher litigation risk, and a decreased CSR score enhances firm value. Our evidence suggests that firms engage in CSR activities partly to reduce shareholder litigation risk ex ante and mitigate its consequences ex post.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Supplementary material: PDF

Freund et al. supplementary material

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