Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T06:07:30.631Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Shareholder Wealth Effects of Directors' Liability Limitation Provisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Abstract

The adoption of liability limitation provisions (LLPs) is associated with insignificant stock price reactions for all firms, but with positive stock price reactions for poorly performing firms. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the net benefit of LLPs is larger for financially troubled firms than for other firms because outside directors are valuable to the distressed firm and LLPs substantially affect experts' expected costs of serving as directors of troubled firms.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable