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Shorting in Broad Daylight: Short Sales and Venue Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2019

Adam V. Reed*
Affiliation:
Reed, adam_reed@unc.edu, University of North Carolina Kenan–Flagler Business School
Mehrdad Samadi
Affiliation:
Samadi, msamadi@smu.edu, Southern Methodist University (SMU) Cox School of Business
Jonathan S. Sokobin
Affiliation:
Sokobin, Jonathan.Sokobin@finra.org, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
*
Reed (corresponding author), adam_reed@unc.edu
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Abstract

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Using a novel database on venue short sales and market design characteristics, we ask: Where do short sellers exploit their information advantage? Consistent with the prediction of Zhu (2014), we find that exchange short sales comprise a larger proportion of trading and are more informative about future prices than dark-pool short sales, particularly when there is greater competition among short sellers to trade and in the presence of short-lived information. When examining market design characteristics, we find that dark pools offering volume-weighted average price crossing attract more short sales, whereas those offering block trading attract fewer short sales.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019