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State Ownership and Debt Choice: Evidence from Privatization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2018

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Abstract

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Using a large sample of privatized firms, we find that state ownership is significantly positively associated with the use of bank debt financing, suggesting that privatized firms benefit from the soft budget constraint associated with state ownership. We further find that the relation is more pronounced in countries with high government ownership of banks, high corruption in bank lending, a left-oriented government, and a collectivist national culture, which provides additional support for the soft-budget-constraint view. Finally, in external validity tests, we find that state ownership affects other aspects of debt structure, such as debt maturity and debt security.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018