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Strategic Mutual Fund Tournaments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 September 2025

Joseph Chen*
Affiliation:
University of California Davis Graduate School of Management
Eric Hughson
Affiliation:
Claremont McKenna College
Neal Stoughton
Affiliation:
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, University of Waterloo School of Accounting and Finance
*
chenjs@ucdavis.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We characterize optimal mutual fund risk-taking strategies in competitive multi-period tournaments among multiple players. With multiple competitors, every player begins by taking maximum risk. In the final period, all players continue to take maximum risk except the leading player, who employs a “lock-in” strategy that depends on the magnitude of the lead. Our theory predicts the leader should strategically lock in advantage by reducing risk-taking if and only if the lead is great enough, rather than an increase in risk-taking by the trailers to try to catch up. Empirical evidence from style-adjusted mutual fund tournaments provides strong and robust support.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington