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Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 March 2023

Reint Gropp
Affiliation:
Halle Institute for Economic Research, University of Magdeburg, and CEPR reint.gropp@iwh-halle.de
Thomas Mosk
Affiliation:
Queen Mary University London, School of Economics and Finance t.mosk@qmul.ac.uk
Steven Ongena
Affiliation:
University of Zurich, Swiss Finance Institute, KU Leuven, and CEPR steven.ongena@bf.uzh.ch
Ines Simac
Affiliation:
KU Leuven ines.simac@kuleuven.be
Carlo Wix*
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Board
*
carlo.e.wix@frb.gov (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments (without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk). We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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