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Takeover Defenses and Dilution: A Welfare Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Abstract

Existing theory suggests that, in an unregulated market for corporate control, the level of takeovers is suboptimal because shareholders do not receive the full benefit from them. However, existing theory neglects that the threat of takeover may divert managerial effort from productive to defensive activities. This paper shows that, when this is considered, takeovers may, in fact, be excessive.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 2001

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