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The Use of Peer Groups in Setting Director Compensation: Competition for Talent Versus Self-Serving Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 April 2023

Sheng-Syan Chen
Affiliation:
National Taiwan University College of Management sschenfn@ntu.edu.tw
Cheng-Yi Chien
Affiliation:
Feng Chia University College of Finance cychien@mail.fcu.edu.tw
Chia-Wei Huang*
Affiliation:
National Chengchi University College of Commerce
*
d94723002@ntu.edu.tw (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions that boards are self-interested in setting director compensation have focused scrutiny on the pay-setting process used by corporations. We examine the effect of peer benchmarking on director compensation decisions. Director pay relates positively to peer director pay, and firms paying their directors highly are selected as peers. Moreover, firm performance and board advising performance are positively related to the talent component and are generally unrelated to the self-serving component of the peer pay effect. The evidence indicates that firms use peer benchmarking to justify high compensation mainly to attract talented directors to enhance board quality.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington