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Why Are Bidder Termination Provisions Included in Takeovers?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 August 2021

Zhiyao Chen
Affiliation:
Lingnan University Faculty of Business nicholaschen@ln.edu.hk
Hamed Mahmudi
Affiliation:
University of Delaware Lerner College of Business and Economics hmahmudi@udel.edu
Aazam Virani*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona Eller College of Management
Xiaofei Zhao
Affiliation:
Georgetown University McDonough School of Business xiaofei.zhao@georgetown.edu
*
avirani@arizona.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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We present a rationale for bidder termination provisions that considers their effect on bidders’ and targets’ joint takeover gains. The provision’s inclusion can create value by enabling termination when the target becomes less valuable to the bidder than on its own, but creates a trade-off because termination may also occur when the target is more valuable to the bidder than on its own. This trade-off explains why the provision is included in only some deals, and explains variation in termination fees. Inclusion of the provision is associated with larger combined announcement returns, provided that the termination fee is priced appropriately.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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Chen et al. supplementary material

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