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Why Do Directors Join Poorly Performing Firms?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2022

Ying Dou*
Affiliation:
Monash University Department of Banking and Finance
Emma Jincheng Zhang
Affiliation:
Monash University Department of Banking and Finance emma.zhang@monash.edu
*
ying.dou@monash.edu (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Prior research has suggested that sitting on the board of a poorly performing firm (PPF) can be undesirable to directors. Still, almost 60% of such firms are able to appoint new directors following director departures. Contrary to a quality matching explanation, we do not find that only poorly performing directors join these firms. Upon joining PPFs, directors are more likely to fill leadership positions without necessarily receiving higher pay. These directors subsequently receive career benefits, especially those who are relatively junior in the pool. As such, the evidence is consistent with the leadership positions providing a certification effect.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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