In an efficient market, spreads will reflect both the issuer’s current risk and investors’ expectations about how that risk might change over time. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) show analytically that a firm’s expected future leverage importantly influences the spread on its bonds. We use capital structure theory to construct proxies for investors’ expectations about future leverage changes and find that these significantly affect bond yields, above and beyond the effect of contemporaneous leverage. Expectations under the trade-off, pecking order, and credit-rating theories of capital structure all receive empirical support, suggesting that investors view them as complementary when pricing corporate bonds.

We find a strong tendency for positive returns during the overnight period followed by reversals during the trading day. This behavior is driven by an opening price that is high relative to intraday prices. It is concentrated among stocks that have recently attracted the attention of retail investors, it is more pronounced for stocks that are difficult to value and costly to arbitrage, and it is greater during periods of high overall retail investor sentiment. The additional implicit transaction costs for retail traders who buy high-attention stocks near the open frequently exceed the effective half spread.

We investigate whether trades made by chief financial officers (CFOs) reveal more information about future stock returns than those by chief executive officers (CEOs). We find that CFOs earn statistically and economically higher abnormal returns following their purchases of company shares than CEOs. During 1992–2002, CFOs earned an average 12-month excess return that is 5% higher than that by CEOs. The superior performance by CFOs occurs notwithstanding controls for risk factors and persists even after their trades are publicly disclosed. Further analysis shows that CFO purchases are associated with more positive future earnings surprises than CEO purchases, suggesting that CFOs incorporate better information about future earnings.

We study decisions to sell nonexcludable private information in the presence of a trading opportunity. Sell-side agents heighten competition among agents who buy their signals to combine with their own for proprietary trading purposes and thereby promote financial market efficiency. This result holds even when the sell-side production technology is not unique. But sell-side information is subject to underinvestment if producers do not internalize the benefits. The model suggests that fee-based compensation for corporate advisory services diminishes this problem and that market efficiency is undermined by forces steering investment-banking resources toward proprietary trading.

U.S. equity mutual funds, on average, prefer realization of capital losses to capital gains. Nevertheless, a substantial fraction exhibits the disposition effect of realizing gains more readily than losses. My analysis suggests that learning effects have reduced the manifestation of the disposition effect over time, implying that academic research has influenced industry practices. When funds experience outflows and are managed by teams of portfolio managers, they are more susceptible to selling disproportionately more winners than losers. Disposition-driven behavior affects investment style, causing lower market betas and characteristics of value-oriented and contrarian styles, but has no observable effect on fund performance.

Macro announcements change the equilibrium risk-free rate. We find that Treasury prices reflect part of the impact instantaneously, but intermediaries rely on their customer order flow after the announcement to discover the full impact. This customer flow informativeness is strongest when analyst macro forecasts are most dispersed. The result holds for 30-year Treasury futures trading in both electronic and open-outcry markets. We further show that intermediaries benefit from privately recognizing informed customer flow, as their own-account trading profitability correlates with customer order access.

This study tests whether belief differences affect the cross-sectional variation of risk-neutral skewness using data on firm-level stock options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange from 2003 to 2006. We find that stocks with greater belief differences have more negative skews, even after controlling for systematic risk and other firm-level variables known to affect skewness. Factor analysis identifies latent variables linked to risk and belief differences. The belief factor explains more variation in the risk-neutral skewness than the risk-based factor. Our results suggest that belief differences may be one of the unexplained firm-specific components affecting skewness.

Variation in idiosyncratic return volatility from 1978 to 2009 is attributable to discretionary accrual volatility and the correlation between premanaged earnings and discretionary accruals reflective of information quality across firms. These results are robust to controls for firm operating uncertainty, growth options, business-cycle variations, and firm age and industry effects, and they highlight the importance of managerial discretion in determining idiosyncratic volatility.