Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T02:48:13.489Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Notes on the ἀριστεία of Thebes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

M. Cary
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

According to the calculations of Busolt, whose elaborate essay on the Spartan army may be regarded as the standard work on this subject, the forces which King Cleombrotus took into action at Leuctra consisted of four out of the six μόραι, each containing 35 out of the 40 service classes, and 300 ἱππεῖς, or Guards.

That 35 classes were mobilised for the campaign of Leuctra is directly attested by Xenophon and cannot be called into question. That four out of the six μόραι took part in the battle is an inference from another passage in Xenophon, which states that three years previously Cleombrotus was despatched to Central Greece with four μόραι.

This inference is only valid if we may assume that the Spartan forces in Phocis were maintained at undiminished strength from 374 to 371 B.C. But such an assumption is hardly justified. A priori it is unlikely that a force representing some 60 per cent, of the entire military establishment of Sparta should have been marooned in Central Greece for three years on end. The Spartan government was of necessity most economical in the use of its citizen troops. As a general rule it reserved them for the critical operations of a field campaign and recalled them home at the close of each fighting season. For the routine duties of garrison service it relied almost entirely on mercenaries. But the emergency which had necessitated the sending of a large field force to Phocis in 374 B.C. had passed away long before the campaign of Leuctra. In 374, no doubt, a strong Theban force was concentrated for the invasion of Phocis. In 373 and 372, however, the Thebans were preoccupied with the coercion of Thespiae and the occupation of Plataea; and in view of the ill-concealed hostility of Athens and the presence of an Attic force on the Boeotian border at Oropus, we may fairly assume that a considerable portion of the Theban field forces had during these years to be called away from the Phocian frontier.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , 1922, pp. 184 - 191
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1922

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

1 Hermes, 1905, pp. 387–449. ProfessorToynbee, (J.H.S. 1913, p. 271)Google Scholar reaches similar conclusions.

2 Hellenica, vi. 4. 17.

3 Ibid. vi. 1. 1.

4 In 374 B.C. the Spartans had to refuse an urgent request from Polydamas of Pharsalus for assistance against Jason of Pherae, because they could not beat up an army of any sort for this purpose (Hellen. vi. 1. 17).

5 Hellen. vi. 3. 1. For the date see Grote, , History of Greece (1903 ed.), vol. viii. p. 150sqq.Google Scholar

6 Vide the Plataicus of Isocrates.

7 Ibid. 20.

8 This consideration seems decisive against Beloch's theory that Cleombrotus' force was not sent to Phocis until 371 B.C. (Griechische Geschichte, 1st ed., vol. ii. p. 251, n. 3).

9 Hellen. vi. 4. 15.

10 Op. cit. p. 425. Busolt further concludes that at Leuetra the proportion of Spartan citizens to Perioeci in the μόραι had sunk to 1:5. Professor Toynbee (loc. cit.) establishes a ratio of 1:10. Neither of these estimates is inconceivable, for in Spartan field tactics the rear-rank men were trained merely to follow No. 1 in each file (Xenophon, Resp. Lac. ch. 11), and one Spartan as πρωτοστάτης to each file would at a pinch be sufficient. But we should feel happier if we could assume a less complete dilution of the μόραι with τερίοικοι.

11 Op. cit. p. 417.

12 The ῥήτρα of Epitadas, which permitted the concentration of the Spartan land in a few hands, probably belongs to the middle rather than to the beginning of the fourth century (Toynbee, p. 273). In any case, its effects by 371 B.C. could not have been devastating.

The severe depopulation upon which Aristotle, comments (Politics, ii. 5)Google Scholar was the result of the disasters which befell Sparta after Leuetra.

13 Diodorus, xv. 31.

14 Op. cit. p. 422. Professor Toynbee raises the Laconian contingent to 4,480 hoplites.

15 Hellen. vi. 4. 9.

16 Pelopidas, ch. 20.

17 Meyer, , Geschichte des Altertums, v. p. 412Google Scholar; Delbrück, , Geschichte der Kriegskunst, i. p. 156Google Scholar, n. 2.

18 This was the strength of the corps levied for service against the Chalcidians in 382 B.C. (Hellen. v. 2. 20).

19 The strength of the μόρα varied according to the number of service classes mobilised. According to Busolt's careful calculations, the μόραι engaged at Leuctra numbered at most 576 men each.

20 Busolt, p. 433.

21 Professor Toynbee assumes that the Guards' corps was practically annihilated, and that the total losses of the Spartan citizen troops were relatively far heavier (op. cit. p. 271). But according to Xenophon the battle at first went in favour of the Spartans at the point where KingCleombrotus, stood (Hellen. vi. 4. 13).Google Scholar The impact of the Theban phalanx therefore fell upon the μόραι rather than upon the Guards, in which case the Perioeci probably suffered their full share of casualties.

22 History of Greece (1913 ed.), p. 596.

23 In assuming that the delay did not exceed a week in duration, Professor Bury states the case as unfavourably as possible for himself. A detailed calculation will show that seven days represents the minimum lapse of time.

24 Archidamus, § 9:

25 Hellen. vi. 4. 16–17.

26 Ibid. iv. 3. 3–9.

27 Ibid. vi. 4. 15, 24.

28 Ibid. vi. 4. 25–6.

29 Else Archidamus would have waited for his Peloponnesian allies to fall in, instead of hastening on ahead of them (Hellen. vi. 4. 26).

30 Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 171; Michel, Recueil d'Inscriptions Grecques, No. 193; Dittenberger, , Sylloge (3rd ed.), No. 183Google Scholar; Niese, , Hermes, 1899, pp. 542–548.Google Scholar

31 Athenische Mitteilungen, 1911, pp. 349–360.

32 Hicks and Hill, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 119.

33 Hellen. vii. 3. 1.

34 See Niese, , Hermes, 1899, pp. 527–542.Google Scholar The date selected by Niese, 367 B.C., is rather too late, as Meyer, (Geschichte des Altertums, v. p. 433)Google Scholar has pointed out. The foundation of Megalopolis probably stands in connexion with the second Peloponnesian expedition of Epaminondas, which befell in 369 according to the common dating, or in 368, according to the more credible reckoning of Clinton, and Niese, (Hermes, 1904, pp. 84–108).Google Scholar

35 Plutarch, Pelopidas, ch. 35. The ‘Malcitus’ of Plutarch's text can safely be identified with the ‘Malecidas’ of the inscription.

36 Pelopidas was Boeotarch every year (so Diodorus, xv. 81), or thirteen times (so Plutarch, ch. 34) since 378 B.C. Since Epaminondas' fleet must have been a federal Boeotian armament, and not merely a Theban affair, it may be taken for granted that its admiral was a Boeotarch (pace Meyer, op. cit. v. p. 462).

37 Köhler, , Hermes, 1892, p. 638.Google Scholar

38 The eclipse which preceded his death took place on July 13, 364. (Ginzel, , Spezieller Kanon der Sonnen- und Mondfinsternisse, pp. 24–5, 182.Google Scholar)

39 Beloch, op. cit. ii. p. 281, n. 3.