Metaphor occupies a paradoxical position in contemporary scholarship: it is among the most intensively examined phenomena in language and thought, yet one of the least theoretically settled. Debates across philosophy, linguistics, pragmatics, and cognitive science have generated competing accounts of its nature, function, and epistemic status without producing a stable consensus. Few studies, however, have sought to reconstruct these debates within a sustained historical and comparative framework. Stefana Garello’s The Enigma of Metaphor: Philosophy, Pragmatics, Cognitive Science undertakes precisely this task. By tracing the conceptual oppositions that have structured metaphor theory from Aristotle to contemporary cognitive science, the book aims not merely to survey positions but to clarify the persistent tensions underlying them. This review first outlines Garello’s central arguments and then evaluates the extent to which her pluralistic resolution succeeds in addressing the enduring enigma of metaphor.
The book comprises six chapters and a brief conclusion. As its title indicates, it examines philosophical, pragmatic, and cognitive approaches to metaphor within a historical and comparative framework. Broadly speaking, the discussion is organized around three central dichotomies: (1) metaphor as a matter of thought versus metaphor as a matter of style; (2) literal meaning versus metaphorical meaning; and (3) the propositional versus non-propositional (imagistic) dimensions of cognition in metaphor.
In addressing the cognitive and stylistic dimensions of metaphor, Garello contends that Aristotle did not posit a tension between these two values. On the contrary, in his account they are mutually reinforcing. In the post-Aristotelian tradition, however, the cognitive and stylistic aspects of metaphor gradually became dissociated, and metaphor was reduced to a merely ornamental device, thereby losing much of its philosophical significance. Although Aristotle regarded simile as a special case of metaphor, later tradition reversed this relation, treating metaphor as a form of simile—a position frequently (and mistakenly) attributed to Aristotle himself. This dual development—the separation of cognition from style and the inversion of the metaphor–simile relation—exerted a lasting influence on metaphor theory for several centuries. In the seventeenth century, with the rise of empiricism and the injunction against metaphor in the works of thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, this tendency reached its apex. Yet the same period also witnessed a renewed appreciation of the Aristotelian insight that metaphor enables the perception of similarity within dissimilarity, thereby foregrounding its cognitive force.
In the eighteenth century, metaphor theory took a different turn as it became intertwined with debates concerning the origin of language. Within this framework, the purely stylistic conception of metaphor was largely abandoned, and the question emerged whether metaphor played a constitutive role in the emergence of language itself. Drawing on Giambattista Vico, Garello argues that metaphor was both temporally and logically prior to literal language, playing an indispensable role in the genesis of language and in the formation and development of abstract concepts.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anthropological and philosophical approaches—most notably those of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hans Blumenberg—further underscored the centrality of metaphor in language and thought. This trajectory culminated in the resurgence of metaphor theory in the latter half of the twentieth century, especially in Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). During this period, two sharply contrasting orientations emerged. On the one hand, logical positivism and generative grammar tended to regard metaphor as merely decorative. On the other hand, the interaction view—most influentially articulated by I. A. Richards—conceived language as fundamentally metaphorical, echoing earlier insights found in Tesauro, Vico, and Nietzsche. Richards redefined metaphor as the interaction between two elements, traditionally termed tenor and vehicle, a model further elaborated by Max Black through his distinction between focus and frame. Paul Ricoeur likewise contributed to refining the interactionist account.
Lakoff and Johnson’s CMT subsequently reconceptualized metaphor as a basic cognitive mechanism, thereby reshaping the field. Despite its influence, however, CMT has faced sustained criticism, including methodological concerns and reliance on constructed examples to substantiate theoretical claims—issues that Garello addresses in Chapter Three. Moreover, the reduction of diverse metaphorical phenomena to a single underlying mechanism (conceptual mapping) has been questioned, prompting alternative proposals such as the Career of Metaphor hypothesis advanced by Brian Bowdle and Dedre Gentner.
The relation between literal and metaphorical meaning constitutes another major axis of the book (Chapter Four) and forms the second central dichotomy. Garello approaches this issue through two competing hypotheses: direct versus indirect access to metaphorical meaning. Lakoff and Johnson’s rejection of a strict boundary between literal and metaphorical meaning aligns with the direct-access position. By contrast, pragmatic theorists such as Grice and Searle defend the indirect-access view, according to which interpretation proceeds from literal meaning to metaphorical understanding. Garello also examines graded salience theory, which posits variability in the relation between literal and metaphorical meaning; relevance theory, which analyzes metaphor as a species of implicature; and the ad hoc concept hypothesis, which construes metaphorical meaning as explicit content derived through conceptual adjustment. She ultimately concludes that the contribution of literal meaning to metaphor interpretation resists a unified account, since it varies according to metaphor type and contextual conditions.
The limitations of pragmatic accounts in explaining the non-propositional dimensions of metaphor lead to the third dichotomy examined in Chapter Five: the opposition between propositional and imagistic (non-propositional) aspects. This distinction turns on the relation between metaphor and mental imagery. Although Aristotle did not sharply dissociate cognitive from imagistic dimensions, later traditions did, giving rise to competing theoretical orientations. Garello classifies these as ‘proposition theories’, dominant in pragmatic frameworks (including relevance theory and Gricean and Searlean approaches), and ‘image theories’, associated with thinkers such as Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, Ernie Lepore, and Matthew Stone. The latter deny the existence of a distinct metaphorical meaning and instead emphasize the role of mental imagery in metaphor comprehension.
After weighing the respective strengths and limitations of these approaches, Garello proposes that they capture different aspects of a single, heterogeneous phenomenon: novel metaphors tend to engage imagistic processes, whereas conventional metaphors function in a more propositional and conceptual manner. This mediating position recalls Robyn Carston’s distinction between local and imagistic metaphors.
In Chapter Six, Garello synthesizes the results of her analysis of the three dichotomies and argues that metaphor does not constitute a unified and homogeneous phenomenon. Rejecting the natural kind hypothesis—the claim that metaphor forms a natural category—she contends that the persistent contradictions within metaphor theory arise from the assumption that ‘metaphor’ designates a single, stable entity. Instead, she characterizes it as ‘a flexible, complex, and multilayered theoretical construct’ (162). The apparent inconsistencies among competing accounts, she suggests, stem from the tendency to subsume heterogeneous phenomena under a single term. Her central claim is thus that any definition of metaphor is framework-dependent: metaphor is not a natural kind but a multi-faceted philosophical construct that demands a genuinely pluralistic approach.
Although Garello’s book is largely successful in reconstructing the historical development of metaphor theory from philosophical, pragmatic, and cognitive perspectives, it might have been further enriched in two closely related respects: through a more sustained engagement with the Continental philosophical tradition and a more systematic consideration of semiotic approaches. While prominent Continental figures such as Nietzsche and Ricoeur receive careful attention, the absence of extended discussion of other major thinkers—most notably Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida—leaves a significant dimension of the debate comparatively underexplored. Even a concise but explicit engagement with these philosophers could have broadened the book’s philosophical reach. As Cazeaux (Reference Cazeaux2007: 1) argues, the Continental tradition from Kant to Derrida ‘provides arguments which not only inform and support existing claims for the cognitive value of metaphor, but also extend the significance of the figure to the point where it becomes an ontological tension, operating in between the fundamental distinctions of philosophy’. Incorporating such perspectives would therefore not merely have supplied additional historical context, but would have amplified the ontological and epistemological stakes of the inquiry.
A further concern is the book’s relatively modest engagement with semiotic traditions, which narrows the theoretical horizon by privileging philosophical semantics and cognitive theory over broader sign-based frameworks. Semiotic approaches have long furnished conceptual resources for understanding metaphor not simply as a linguistic deviation or a cognitive mapping mechanism, but as a dynamic process operating within complex systems of signification. A more sustained dialogue with thinkers such as Charles Sanders Peirce—whose triadic model of the sign and concept of unlimited semiosis (Peirce Reference Peirce, Houser and Kloesel1992) provide fertile ground for rethinking metaphorical reference—Roman Jakobson, with his influential distinction between metaphor and metonymy (Jakobson Reference Jakobson1956/1971), and Algirdas Greimas and Roland Barthes, who situate figurative meaning within structural and cultural codes, could have productively complemented Garello’s analysis. Taken together, the Continental and semiotic traditions suggest that metaphor operates not only at the level of cognition and propositional content, but also within broader ontological, structural, and cultural configurations. Greater integration of these perspectives might thus have extended the book’s theoretical scope, situating metaphor more explicitly within debates concerning signification, structure, and the constitution of meaning.
Overall, The Enigma of Metaphor is likely to prove valuable to scholars working in cognitive science, pragmatics, and philosophy. As Garello herself notes, the book offers a clearer and more comprehensive perspective on the complex and often discontinuous history of metaphor theory across centuries. In clarifying the conceptual tensions that have shaped the field, it also provides a more secure foundation for future research conducted with heightened theoretical self-awareness and precision.
