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The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Anthony G. Pazzanita
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Extract

Of the dozens of conflicts in the Third World which have occurred in the post-war era, few have been of greater duration and bloodshed or have attracted the attention of as many outside actors, including the superpowers, as Angola. It has only been since the mid-1980s that the conflict began moving towards eventual settlement, with the prospects for peace often seeming to depend largely on the attitudes of Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Further affecting the overall environment was the state of East–West relations, the internal situation in Angola, and South Africa's occupation of Namibia. A short historical background will serve as prelude to an extensive examination of the dynamics which fuelled the war in Angola for such a long period of time.

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The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , March 1991, pp. 83 - 114
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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References

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65 Bender, loc. cit. p. 22. For a description of the earlier stages of this process, see Zartman, op. cit. p. 228.

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