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Institutional Sources of German Monetary Policy Dynamics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Karl Kaltenthaler
Karl Kaltenthaler*
Affiliation:
International Studies, Rhodes College*
*
International Studies Rhodes College 2000 North Parkway Memphis, TN 38 112-1690 email: Kattenthaler@rhodes.edu Fax: (1) 901 843 3371
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Abstract

This article seeks to answer the question of why we see continuity in German monetary policy but relative discontinuity in German policy toward European monetary regimes. The paper develops an analytical framework for understanding the factors that account for the dynamics of policy. The article argues that the institutional structure of policy-making is the key factor that accounts for patterns of policy dynamics. The way domestic policy institutions are structured will determine who has a say and when they have a say in policy-making, thus shaping the pattern of policy dynamics. The article shows that the institutions of policy-making are crucial determinants in the dynamics of German monetary and regime policy by the way they offer or block opportunities, at particular points in the policy process, for interested policy actors to achieve the types of policies they want.

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Articles
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , September 1997, pp. 269 - 297
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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Footnotes

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 28-September 1, 1996. Thanks are also due to Christopher Anderson, Don Hancock, Arnold Heidenheimer, Jack Knight, Douglass North, Richard Rose, Andy Sobel, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the paper. Any errors that remain are my responsibility. Support for this research came from the P.K. Seidman Fellowship in Political Economy.

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