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Explaining deviations from the Stability and Growth Pact: power, ideology, economic need or diffusion?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2015

Michael A. Hansen*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA E-mail: hansenma@uwm.edu
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Abstract

Why do some countries deviate from European Union law? More specifically, why do countries violate the Stability and Growth Pact, which is a cornerstone piece of legislation for the shared economy? Is it that violators simply have no other choice due to economic need? Are the violators intentional deviators that are simply able to violate the Stability and Growth Pact because of their power in the European Union? This article answers these questions and identifies those factors that are most likely to impact a country’s deviation from the two main clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact. The major finding is that it is economic need, not a country’s relative power, governing ideology or diffusion, that has a large impact on which clause will be violated.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press, 2015 
Figure 0

Table 1Stability and Growth Pact: Debt Breach Models

Figure 1

Figure 1The effect of economic need on breaking the Debt Clause.

Figure 2

Figure 2The effect of gross domestic product (GDP) growth on breaking the deficit clause (t−1).

Figure 3

Table 2Stability and Growth Pact: Deficit Breach models

Figure 4

Figure 3The effect of economic need on breaking the deficit clause.