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Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2014

Manuel Fischer*
Affiliation:
Swiss Federal Institute for Aquatic Research and Technology Eawag and University of Berne, Switzerland E-mail: manuel.fischer@eawag.ch
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Abstract

Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press, 2014 
Figure 0

Table 1Calibration of outcome and conditions

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Table 2Truth table for the analysis of dominant coalitions

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Table 3Sufficient conditions for the emergence of a dominant coalition

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Table 4Truth table for the analysis of competing coalitions

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Table 5Sufficient conditions for the emergence of competing coalitions

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Table A.1Coalition structure and corresponding fuzzy-membership values

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Table A.2Federalism and fuzzy-membership values

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Table A.3Europeanisation and fuzzy-membership values

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Table A.4Venue openness and fuzzy-membership values

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Table A.5Necessary conditions