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No vacancy: holdover capacity and the continued staffing of major commissions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 April 2016

Anthony Madonna
Affiliation:
University of Georgia E-mail: ajmadonn@uga.edu
Ian Ostrander
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University, USA E-mail: ian.ostrander@gmail.com
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Abstract

Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a holdover official is important as it can determine whether a board is functional or inoperable. In this article, we examine how the presence of holdover provisions within such commissions alters confirmation dynamics and vacancy rates. Evidence suggests that holdover provisions lead to quicker confirmation on nominations as well as fewer complete vacancies. Such structures thus help mitigate the short-term problems stemming from staffing independent regulatory boards, especially given the tendency towards obstruction in the US Senate.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press, 2016 
Figure 0

Table 1Distribution of holdover capacity within major boards

Figure 1

Figure 1Months with complete vacancies by holdover capacity: 2001–2009

Figure 2

Table 2Average months from vacancy to presidential nomination: 107–110th congresses

Figure 3

Figure 2Kaplan-Meier survival function for major boards: 1987–2012

Figure 4

Table 3Duration of major board nominations in the senate: 1987–2012