Genealogy of public policy definition: from North Globe to South Global critique

Public policy has historically been conceptualized through lenses largely shaped by the Global North, emphasizing rationality, technical expertise, and formal institutional processes (Howlett and Ramesh Reference Howlett, Ramesh and Perl2020; Sabatier Reference Sabatier2021). Classical models assume that policy problems are objectively identifiable, solutions can be designed through systematic analysis, and implementation proceeds through neutral bureaucratic channels (Lasswell Reference Lerner, Lasswell, Lerner and Lasswell1951; Simon Reference Simon1976). These paradigms have profoundly influenced administrative reform frameworks, including New Public Management (NPM), which prioritize efficiency, accountability, and performance measurement as central indicators of policy success (Dunleavy et al. Reference Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler2006; Hood Reference Hood1991). The North-centric orientation implicitly assumes a universality of administrative rationality and policy logic, often disregarding historical, cultural, and political particularities in governance environments outside these contexts.

However, scholarship emerging from the Global South has problematized these assumptions, highlighting the situated nature of policy making in environments marked by institutional fragility, clientelism, and sociopolitical complexity (Andrews Reference Andrews2013; Azhar et al. Reference Azhar, Sabharwal and Rahman2026, Yan et al. Reference Yan, Saguin and Coban2026). In these contexts, policy cannot be adequately understood solely as a technical instrument or as a rational response to societal needs; it is simultaneously a social and political construct, reflecting local power relations, historical trajectories, and normative expectations. For example, what constitutes a “successful policy” in Indonesia may differ significantly from definitions rooted in European or North American bureaucracies, as formal compliance may coexist with substantive shortcomings in service delivery (Christensen Reference Christensen2002).

The Global South critique also challenges the epistemological foundations of policy studies (Yan et al. Reference Yan, Saguin and Coban2026). Conventional North-based models emphasize linear causality between policy design, implementation, and outcomes, often relying on quantitative evaluation metrics (Pérez-Durán Reference Pérez-Durán2024; Pollitt Reference Pollitt2016). In contrast, interpretive scholarship foregrounds the contingent and context-dependent nature of policy, arguing that political, cultural, and social forces shape both the process and perceived effectiveness of policy interventions (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow Reference Schwartz-Shea and Yanow2012; Yanow Reference Yanow2000). In Indonesia, for instance, performance indices such as SAKIP or SPBE capture formal adherence to administrative norms but frequently mask underlying inequities or selective implementation shaped by political incentives (Murphy Reference Murphy2026).

Moreover, the Global South perspective underscores that public policy is inseparable from governance structures, historical legacies, and societal hierarchies (Grindle Reference Grindle2017; Lodge and Wegrich Reference Lodge and Wegrich2014). Policies are enacted within webs of patronage, local elites’ influence, and bureaucratic survival strategies, meaning that formal policy design is often only one dimension of a much broader political and social process. Recognizing this, contemporary scholarship emphasizes the need to examine not just policy texts or official procedures, but also the power dynamics, resource allocations, and informal mechanisms that shape outcomes on the ground (Andrews Reference Andrews2013; Azhar et al. Reference Azhar, Sabharwal and Rahman2026).

In sum, the genealogy of public policy definitions reveals a tension between normative, North-centric ideals of rationality and technical efficiency and the contextual realities of policy making in the Global South. Understanding this tension is critical for analyzing the politicization of policy in Indonesia, where formal structures often intersect with deeply embedded political and social dynamics, producing outcomes that diverge from conventional notions of policy success (Christensen Reference Christensen2002). This critique sets the stage for subsequent discussion on how political mechanisms shape public policy and its implementation across sectors.

Politicization as systemic logic: theorizing the anatomy of “the political” in public policy

Understanding politicization requires moving beyond treating it as a mere descriptor of political interference. We must theorize its anatomy, the specific forms, mechanisms, and logics through which politics permeates policy processes. In Global South contexts like Indonesia, politicization operates not as isolated acts of distortion, but as a constitutive system that shapes governance outcomes. This section develops such a theory by synthesizing critical scholarship to propose an integrated, five-dimensional framework.

The conceptual starting point is recognizing that in hybrid governance systems, “the political” cannot be understood through North-centric binaries that oppose rational administration to political interference. Instead, following Grindle (Reference Grindle2017) and Andrews (Reference Andrews2013), we must examine how political and administrative logics are inextricably fused within institutional practices. This fusion produces what Moynihan and Soss (Reference Moynihan and Soss2014) identify as a policy feedback loop: administrative systems themselves become political instruments that shape power distributions, which in turn reshape those same systems. In Indonesia, this creates a governance reality where, as Hupe and Hill (Reference Hupe and Hill2016) argue, the “implementation deficit” is not a failure of execution but a logical outcome of a system where political calculations routinely override technical designs.

Building on this foundation, we contend that analyzing this systemic reality requires disaggregating “the political” into its constituent dimensions. Scholarship has approached these dimensions in fragmented ways: studies of elite power (Baumgartner et al. 2021: Beyer et al. Reference Beyer, Breunig, Klüser, van Gerven, Rothmayr Allison and Schubert2023), bureaucratic agency (Lipsky Reference Lipsky2010), international influence (Benson and Jordan Reference Benson and Jordan2011), performance ritualism (Pollitt Reference Pollitt2016), and technological politics (Cordella and Tempini Reference Cordella and Tempini2015; Muallidin and Supratikta Reference Muallidin and Supratikta2026). However, the critical theoretical gap, and this study’s core contribution lies in integrating these dimensions to show how they interact as a coherent system. The following subsections elaborate each dimension, not as isolated categories but as interconnected components of a singular logic of politicization.

Dimension 5: the digital governance paradox – technology as political amplifier

Finally, we must account for how new technologies are absorbed into this system. Digital tools promise transparency and efficiency, but as Cordella and Tempini (Reference Cordella and Tempini2015) warn, they often “reproduce rather than disrupt” existing power relations. In Indonesia, digital platforms become what Fung (Reference Fung2015) might call “technologies of political spectacle” dashboards that display politically favorable data, or apps that service connected communities while excluding others.

This creates a digital paradox: tools meant to solve governance problems become new arenas for political contestation and exclusion. Dimension 5 shows how technological innovation gets domesticated by the preexisting logic of politicization.

The conceptual relationship between these five dimensions is mapped out visually in the theoretical model presented in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1.

Politicization as systemic logic in public policy, 2025.

Figure 1. Long description

A flowchart illustrating the process of politicization as systemic logic in public policy. The flowchart starts with the central concept of politicization as systemic logic. From this central concept, five branches extend to different processes: Elite Agenda-Setting, Bureaucratic Strategic Adaptation, Donor-Induced Isomorphism, Symbolic Compliance, and The Digital Governance Paradox. Each of these processes leads to further outcomes. Elite Agenda-Setting leads to the Primary Political Filter. Bureaucratic Strategic Adaptation leads to the Transmission Belt. Donor-Induced Isomorphism leads to the Transnational Script. Symbolic Compliance leads to Accountability Theater. The Digital Governance Paradox leads to Technologies of Political Spectacle. All these outcomes then feed into the Policy Feedback Loop, which loops back to the central concept of politicization as systemic logic.

Therefore, Figure 1 does not merely summarize isolated concepts but maps the complete and tiered system of political logic. This model illustrates how political logic operates as a coherent and self-reinforcing cycle. Beginning with the filtering of agendas by elites, this logic is then strategically translated by the bureaucracy, framed by global scripts, validated through symbolic accountability performances, and ultimately amplified by digital technologies. Each dimension feeds into and strengthens the others, creating a systematically politicized governance architecture, where public policy is no longer merely a rational instrument for welfare, but a field for the reproduction and legitimation of power. Thus, this figure serves as a roadmap for tracing how politicization becomes embedded, perpetuated, and evolves throughout every stage of the policy process.

The systemic anatomy of politicization in Indonesia’s policy terrain

Politicization in Indonesia operates as a systemic feature rather than sporadic interference. This section examines this logic, moving beyond the superficial narrative of “implementation gaps” to analyze the deliberate, structured, and self-perpetuating processes through which political logics shape public policy. The evidence drawn from Indonesia’s own performance records, budgetary choices, reform trajectories, and oversight institutions (BPK, KPK, Ombudsman RI) reveals a consistent pattern: the instruments of modern governance (SAKIP, digital platforms, strategic plans) have been systematically hollowed out and repurposed as tools for political control, legitimacy production, and resource distribution within elite networks (Grindle Reference Grindle2017; Misran et al. Reference Muallidin, Nanaman and Prasetyo2022).

This politicization is neither random nor merely corrupt. It represents a rational adaptation to a hybrid institutional environment where formal Weberian ideals collide with informal patronage realities (Evans Reference Evans1995). The result is a pervasive decoupling, where a “world of metrics” showcasing efficiency and reform (e.g., rising SAKIP scores, proliferating e-government applications) coexists with a “world of outcomes” marked by stagnant service quality and persistent inequality (Turner et al. 2019). This chasm reflects not a failure of management but the predominance of a different logic: political survival over public problem-solving.

The drivers of this system are multidimensional and mutually reinforcing. Elite agendas filter which problems become “policy-worthy,” prioritizing visible, quick-win projects over complex, long-term social investments (Andrews Reference Andrews2013). The bureaucracy, far from being a neutral implementer, becomes a strategic player in this game, mastering the art of gaming performance indicators to satisfy political masters while minimizing substantive effort (Lipsky Reference Lipsky2010; Moynihan Reference Moynihan2008). The Ombudsman’s Reference Ombudsman2024 compliance assessment documented how provinces such as Sulawesi Utara and districts such as Magelang and Wonogiri systematically adapted their administrative practices, conducting socialization campaigns, technical guidance, and innovation awards, to improve their compliance scores, illustrating rational bureaucratic response to external performance pressure (Ombudsman Reference Ombudsman2024). International donors, meanwhile, often inadvertently fuel this dynamic. Their “best practice” templates, when imposed without regard to local political economies, lead to isomorphic mimicry, the adoption of the form of reform without its functional substance (Andrews Reference Andrews2013).

Consequently, the landscape of Indonesian public policy is characterized by a fundamental paradox: a system increasingly proficient at measuring and reporting its own performance, yet demonstrably ineffective at improving the welfare of its citizens. This paradox captures what scholars have termed accountability theater (Pollitt Reference Pollitt2016) and the digital governance paradox (Cordella and Tempini Reference Cordella and Tempini2015), where technology and metrics amplify political spectacle rather than enabling genuine transparency or participation. The Ombudsman’s Reference Ombudsman2025 assessment reinforces this paradox: despite 84 percent of entities achieving “green zone” compliance status by 2024, the national average service quality remained only 74.64, categorized as “Medium,” with nearly 11 percent of entities still in yellow and red zones (Ombudsman Reference Ombudsman2023; Reference Ombudsman2024; Reference Ombudsman2025).

This chapter provides an analytical mapping of this system. It addresses three questions. First, how do the five dimensions of politicization manifest concretely in the Indonesian context (Section Mapping manifestations: the anatomy of five-dimensional politicization in Indonesian policy)? Second, how do these dimensions interconnect to form a resilient, self-reinforcing systemic logic (Section The systemic logic: deconstructing the causal architecture of politicization)? Third, building on this diagnosis, what normative alternatives exist? How might a “repoliticization” harness political energy for democratic deepening and equitable development in the Global South (Section Normative future: toward a democratic repoliticization of policy in the Global South)? By tracing the anatomy of this system, we aim not merely to critique it but to identify pressure points where transformative intervention might begin.

Mapping manifestations: the anatomy of five-dimensional politicization in Indonesian policy

To comprehend the contemporary face of Indonesian governance, one must dissect the paradox that defines it: a state that is formally becoming more measurable, digitalized, and aligned with global reform frameworks, yet continues to grapple with classic policy maladies, skewed resource allocation, stagnant public services, and an unresponsive bureaucracy. Conventional analysis often labels this an “implementation gap” or a “capacity constraint.”

However, such a diagnosis misses the core pathology. These recurring policy failures are not symptoms of a broken system, but rather the stable and predictable outputs of a system operating under a dominant political logic. This section maps the empirical manifestations of that logic, demonstrating how the five theoretical dimensions of politicization materialize within specific Indonesian policy arenas. The following table synthesizes the concrete evidence, linking observed pathologies to their underlying political dimensions and mechanisms, drawing exclusively from official documents (LAKIP PANRB, BPK, KPK, Ombudsman RI) and peer-reviewed literature.

Based on the empirical evidence mapped in Table 1, a paradoxical yet systematic reality of Indonesian governance is revealed. Official performance metrics from LAKIP PANRB demonstrate formal progress in SAKIP scores, SPBE maturity, and WBK/WBBM achievements. The Ombudsman’s compliance assessments, however, tell a more nuanced story. Between 2023 and 2024, the percentage of entities in the green zone increased from 70.70 percent to 84.16 percent, while red zone entities declined from 6.64 percent to 3.92 percent (Ombudsman Reference Ombudsman2023, Reference Ombudsman2024). Yet the 2025 Maladministration Assessment found the national average service quality to be only 74.64, placing it in the “Medium” category, with 29.22 percent of loci rated “High” quality, 6.49 percent “Low,” and 4.22 percent “Very Low” (Ombudsman Reference Ombudsman2025). This partial convergence, improving compliance scores alongside persistently medium service quality, suggests that formal compliance does not automatically translate into substantive service improvement. This decoupling between reported performance and substantive outcomes reflects what Meyer and Rowan (Reference Meyer and Rowan1977) identified as institutional decoupling: formal metrics become ceremonial rituals rather than tools for genuine improvement.

Table 1.

Empirical correspondence: policy pathologies and dimensions of politicization in Indonesia

Table 1. Long description

A table comparing policy pathologies and dimensions of politicization in Indonesia. The table has 10 rows and 5 columns. The columns are labeled Mapping of policy, Dimension, Empirical evidence & source, Interpretation of mechanism, and AQI. The rows are labeled with different policy mappings and dimensions. Row 1: Mapping of policy, Systemic Budgetary Bias; Dimension, O 1 Elite Agenda-Setting; Empirical evidence & source, Re-examined studies document systematic bias in budgetary allocations, investments in Indonesian regions (Resosudarmo et al., 2019; Lewis, & Bemsahctz, 2019); Interpretation of mechanism, Budget prioritization reflects political visibility, not development needs; projects serve as visible symbols to appease political elites. Row 2: Mapping of policy, Bureaucratic Strategic Allocation; Dimension, O 2 Bureaucratic Strategic Adaptation; Empirical evidence & source, Ombudsman 2023 Case Study: West Java, Best practice two; Interpretation of mechanism, Managing compliance through performance awards, technical assistance, and intensive monitoring (Ombudsman, 2023). Row 3: Mapping of policy, Bureaucracy rationally assesses compliance costs; Dimension, O 3 Donor Induced Realistic Compliance; Empirical evidence & source, Donor funds are allocated to merely ‘substantiate a merely symbolic commitment to a policy’ (Lewis, 2019); Interpretation of mechanism, Donor pressure produces cosmetic compliance rather than genuine reform. Organizations adopt formal policies to secure external legitimacy, but compliance is often symbolic, resulting in form without substance. Row 4: Mapping of policy, SAKIP 74.64, WBK/WBBM vs Ombudsman Performance Claims and Reality; Dimension, D 4 Symbolic; Empirical evidence & source, LAKIP PANRB 2024, SAKIP 84.16 percent, WBK/WBBM 84.16 percent, Ombudsman 2025; Interpretation of mechanism, Decoupling between reported outcomes and substantive performance. Row 5: Mapping of policy, Decoupling between reported outcomes and substantive performance; Dimension, D 5 Digital; Empirical evidence & source, Alker, Evetts, and Christensen (2005) found that digital information is used to demonstrate compliance rather than to improve performance. Row 6: Mapping of policy, Digital technology and digitalization; Dimension, D 6 Digital; Empirical evidence & source, Digital technology and digitalization are deployed as tools for symbolic compliance rather than genuine public service improvement. The low correlation between digitalization and transparency remains a critical issue.

Source: Compiled by authors from secondary data 2022–2025.

The BPK audit finding that 43 percent of foreign-funded e-government platforms remain inactive exemplifies donor-induced isomorphism (D3). Coercive pressure from donors, linking funding to technology adoption, pushes the government to import sophisticated digital platforms as form without substance, to satisfy donor progress reports and signal “modern governance” to international audiences.

Bureaucratic strategic adaptation (D2) further reinforces this system. The Ombudsman’s Reference Ombudsman2024 case studies of Sulawesi Utara, Magelang, and Wonogiri demonstrate how local governments rationally respond to external assessment mechanisms. These entities conducted socialization campaigns, technical guidance sessions, innovation awards, and intensive coordination with the Ombudsman to improve their compliance scores (Ombudsman Reference Ombudsman2024). While Magelang reported that its improved Ombudsman compliance score correlated with rising SAKIP and IKM scores, this very correlation raises critical questions: does this represent genuine service improvement, or have bureaucracies learned to “game” the system through formal compliance activities? Peer-reviewed studies consistently document how “powerful forces resisting reform” and the persistence of New Order-era administrative habits have slowed deeper structural change (Turner et al. 2019; Widowati et al. Reference Widowati, Setyowati and Suharto2023). Civil servants rationally adapt to protect their career interests within a politicized incentive structure.

These dimensions do not work in isolation. They interlock in a self-reinforcing cycle. Donor pressure produces isomorphic mimicry (D3), creating templates that bureaucracies adopt as form without substance. Bureaucratic strategic adaptation (D2) ensures that even well-designed reforms are subverted to protect institutional interests. The result is symbolic compliance (D4), where performance scores rise, whether SAKIP scores or Ombudsman green zone designations, without corresponding improvements in service quality, as evidenced by the persistently medium national average (74.64) in the 2025 Ombudsman assessment. The digital governance paradox (D5) is further evidenced by Akbar, Santoso, and Choirunnisa (2026), who found that while performance information is actively used for internal purposes, planning (4.60), evaluation (4.54), and reporting to elected officials (4.49), its use for public accountability remains low: reporting to the public averaged only 3.60. The study also identified that coercive and normative isomorphic pressures dominate employee behavior, while mimetic pressures remain limited. This suggests performance data and digital platforms serve primarily as tools for internal compliance and legitimacy signaling rather than public transparency.

The Supreme Audit Agency’s own assessment reinforces this paradox. In its 2023 internal publication, BPK acknowledged that “fraud is hidden” and that “there are many ways to hide fraud, including through information technology,” while simultaneously developing digital forensic capabilities to address these risks (BPK 2023, pp. 7–8). This self-awareness, that the digital platforms meant to enhance transparency also create new avenues for fraud, epitomizes the digital governance paradox.

The systemic logic: deconstructing the causal architecture of politicization

The preceding analysis has successfully mapped the five distinct dimensions through which politicization manifests in Indonesian public policy. However, a critical question remains: how do these seemingly separate dimensions relate to one another? Do they operate as isolated pathologies, or do they form part of a larger, coherent system? To move from a taxonomy of symptoms to a diagnosis of the disease, we must trace the connections between them.

This section reveals that politicization is not a collection of random faults but a logical, self-perpetuating system, a chain reaction where the output of one dimension becomes the essential input for the next, creating a closed loop that consistently converts political power into administrative form while voiding it of public substance. To unravel this complex architecture, we turn to a visual model that maps the causal flow of political logic through the policy machinery.

Based on the causal flow depicted in Figure 2, the reality of Indonesian policy can be deconstructed as a regulated production cycle. This cycle begins with the political sovereignty of elites in setting the agenda (D1). In the Indonesian context, this setting is rarely based on deep technical needs analysis, but rather on a calculus of visibility and short-term political dividends. For example, the choice to channel massive budgets into physical infrastructure projects like toll roads or dams, which can be inaugurated and photographed, while neglecting significant budget increases for stunting reduction, whose results are not visible within a single term of office. This politically filtered agenda is not just a list of programs; it creates the operative reality and incentive structure for the bureaucracy. It implicitly declares what is considered “successful” in governance.

Figure 2.

The causal chain of politicization in Indonesian public policy.

This political signal is then received and processed by the bureaucracy through the mechanism of strategic adaptation (D2). The arrow from D1 to D2 represents the core of this theoretical transmission belt. Bureaucrats, as rational actors, read the incentives created by the elite agenda. They understand that career safety and promotion depend on their ability to demonstrate progress on politically set indicators, regardless of their relevance to solving public problems. Their adaptation is thus strategic: they become experts in the “art of simulation.” For instance, a district health office might report “100% of villages have implemented posyandu” (an output indicator that is easy to achieve and report), while simultaneously neglecting a more difficult outcome indicator like “reduction in anemia rates among pregnant women.” Effort is diverted from substantive service improvement to achieving administrative targets that look good on paper.

This process then gains legitimacy and material reinforcement through donor alignment (D3). The key phrase in this model is “Donors align with policy frameworks.” This inverts the common narrative that reform in Indonesia is dictated by foreign donors. Instead, what occurs is active isomorphism: international donors align their programs and funding with the priority frameworks already set by domestic elites. They provide reform scripts, such as performance accountability systems and e-government platforms, that fit the “modernization” and “good governance” agenda already promoted by the elites. By funding and giving international legitimacy to these initiatives, donors indirectly validate and entrench the domestic political agenda, while injecting new resources that strengthen the cycle (Andrews Reference Andrews2013; Benson and Jordan Reference Benson and Jordan2011).

The convergence of political agenda, bureaucratic adaptation, and donor legitimacy then crystallizes into a culture of symbolic compliance (D4). This is the stage where performance is enacted. The SAKIP system becomes the primary tool for this performance. The bureaucracy produces reports, data, and presentations demonstrating perfect compliance with procedures and target achievement. A ministry may achieve a SAKIP score of 90 with immaculate documentation, but that score reflects its team’s skill in “indicatorology,” the art of selecting and meeting easy metrics more than any improvement in the quality of regulation or service delivered. This compliance satisfies two masters: political superiors (D1) who need proof of success for legitimacy, and donors (D3) who need progress reports for project accountability. Thus, the metric system transforms in function from a tool for improvement into a legitimacy ritual.

Digital technology then enters not as a reformer, but as an amplifier (D5) that increases the capacity and speed of the entire cycle. Real-time government performance dashboards make the accountability theater (D4) more spectacular and accessible. Digital reporting platforms make it easier for the bureaucracy (D2) to generate data for symbolic compliance. Government social media becomes a powerful channel for projecting the elite agenda (D1) and “achievements” already reported in SAKIP. However, this amplification is biased. The technology is more effective at reinforcing control and narrative from the top than opening channels for participation from below. The result is the digital paradox: rapid progress in government IT infrastructure coincides with deepening exclusion for communities lacking digital literacy or access, and an expanding state surveillance capacity.

Ultimately, this entire causal chain produces the paradoxical outcomes precisely listed under “Results.” “High SAKIP scores” are the direct product of D4 (Symbolic Compliance). “Stagnant services” are the logical consequence of D2 (Bureaucratic Adaptation), where energy is diverted from substantive improvement to performance simulation. “Digital exclusion” is the outcome of D5 (The Digital Paradox), which designs technology to serve political logic rather than inclusion logic. Therefore, every pathology in the results box is not an isolated failure, but a predictable output programmed by a specific dimension within the system. This reality explains why Indonesia is trapped in a governance paradox: the better its SAKIP scores, the more digital platforms it has, yet the less improvement its people feel. The system is functioning perfectly, not to solve public problems, but to produce political legitimacy and perpetuate the existing cycle of power. Understanding this systematic interconnection is the key to dismantling the logic of politicization and, more importantly, to identifying the leverage points where this deadly cycle can be broken.

This empirical model of interconnected cycles serves as the definitive validation and operationalization of the theoretical framework presented in Figure 1 (Politicization as Systemic Logic). Where the theoretical framework posited abstract dimensions and a generic feedback loop, this analysis reveals the precise Indonesian mechanisms through which these concepts materialize. The “Primary Political Filter” (D1) is observed in action as the elite’s visibility calculus shapes the budget. The “Transmission Belt” (D2) is identified in the bureaucratic art of simulation. The “Transnational Script” (D3) is seen in the donor alignment that provides reform templates. The “Accountability Theater” (D4) is performed on the stage of the SAKIP system. The “Technologies of Political Spectacle” (D5) are witnessed in the biased amplification of digital dashboards.

Most significantly, the theoretical notion of a “Policy Feedback Loop” is empirically substantiated and specified as not one but three interlocking cycles (Agenda-Performance, Reform-Implementation, Digital Amplification) that reinforce the system’s logic. Thus, the findings presented here do not merely apply a foreign theoretical model to Indonesia; they demonstrate how the Indonesian context breathes life into, confirms, and elaborates upon that model, proving that politicization indeed operates as a systemic not sporadic logic within the country’s public policy.

Normative future: toward a democratic repoliticization of policy in the Global South

The preceding sections diagnose politicization as the systemic logic of public policy in Indonesia, producing a cycle of symbolic governance. Given its ineradicable nature in the Global South, the critical question shifts from elimination to redirection. This section proposes a normative recalibration: the future lies not in a futile pursuit of a technocratic utopia, but in deliberately channeling political energy toward inclusive, substantive, and accountable ends, a process termed democratic repoliticization.

The imperative is twofold. First, technical solutions are neutralized by the existing political logic (the Reform-Implementation Trap). Second, an apolitical administration is unrealistic and potentially anti-democratic. The task is to reclaim “the political” as a domain for democratic struggle, not elite capture. This requires reimagining each dimension of our framework.

First, in agenda-setting (D1), the aim is to democratize the “political filter” through public reason. Institutional innovations like participatory budgeting and citizen assemblies can inject grassroots priorities. Indonesia’s Musrenbang must become a genuine arena for deliberative priority-setting with mandated follow-through.

Second, the bureaucracy (D2) must be reconceived as “civic infrastructure.” Incentive structures should reward substantive problem-solving and accountability. Performance metrics (SAKIP) must incorporate community-defined outcomes, and career advancement tied to public impact, not political loyalty. Bureaucratic autonomy is essential.

Third, the interface with global actors (D3) must transition to problematized translation. Support should go to locally driven processes of problem-driven iterative adaptation (Andrews Reference Andrews2013), not isomorphic mimicry. Success should be measured by solving local problems, not compliance with external blueprints.

Fourth, the accountability (D4) arena must evolve into a pluralistic ecosystem. The monopolistic “theater” of SAKIP reports must be supplemented by horizontal and downward mechanisms: independent audits, community scorecards, and open data for public scrutiny. Civil society and media must be strengthened as critical audiences.

Finally, technology (D5) must be infrastructure for democratic deepening. Digital tools should be evaluated on inclusion, transparency, and empowerment prioritizing open data, participatory platforms with real feedback, and privacy-by-design to prevent surveillance.

In conclusion, democratic repoliticization calls for a different kind of politics: overt, inclusive, substantive, and accountable. In the Global South, the technical-administrative project is doomed to capture. The sustainable path is to democratize governance’s political channels and recalibrate its purposes. For Indonesia, this means a second generation of reform, moving beyond technical fixes to SAKIP metrics or digital dashboards, targeting the very political-institutional logic that shapes policy. This is the future politicization worth striving for.