Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2jgqx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T15:53:43.594Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

State capture from below? The contradictory effects of decentralisation on public spending

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2015

Sean Mueller
Affiliation:
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, Switzerland E-mail: sean.mueller@ipw.unibe.ch
Adrian Vatter
Affiliation:
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, Switzerland E-mail: adrian.vatter@ipw.unibe.ch
Tobias Arnold
Affiliation:
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, Switzerland E-mail: tobias.arnold@students.unibe.ch
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This study analyses the contradictory effects of decentralisation on public spending. We distinguish three dimensions of decentralisation and analyse their joint and separate effects on public spending in the Swiss cantons over 20 years. We find that overall decentralisation has a strong, significant and negative effect on the size of the public sector, thus confirming the Leviathan hypothesis. The same holds for fiscal and institutional decentralisation. However, the extent to which political processes and actors are organised locally rather than centrally actually increases central and decreases local spending. This suggests that actors behave strategically when dealing with the centre by offloading the more costly policies. The wider implication of our study is that the balance between self-rule and shared rule has implications also for the size of the overall political system.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press, 2015 
Figure 0

Table 1Expected impact of decentralisation on spending

Figure 1

Figure 1Conceptual structure of cantonal decentralisation. LGA=Local Government Association

Figure 2

Table 2Results of time-series cross-sectional models

Figure 3

Table 3Relative impact of decentralisation on spending

Figure 4

Figure A.1Empirical distribution of cantonal decentralisation dimensions Note: Mean values over the entire period are used for the sake of simplicity.

Figure 5

Table A.1Two factor analyses for politics-decentralisation

Figure 6

Table A.2Factor analysis for overall decentralisation

Figure 7

Table A.3Variable description

Figure 8

Table A.4Summary statistics

Figure 9

Table A.5Results of step-by-step time-series cross-sectional models

Figure 10

Table A.6Results of time-series cross-sectional models including generalised variance-inflation factor (GVIF) values

Figure 11

Table A.6(Continued)