Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T16:05:58.646Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A formalisation of referentially opaque contexts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

L. Jonathan Cohen*
Affiliation:
The Queen's College Oxford University

Extract

In most published systems of modal logic only one or two modal operators occur as undefined constants alongside the primitives of non-modal logic. But in a single informal argument many non-interdefinable modal operators may occur. E.g. in philosophy we may have ‘it is logically true that’, ‘it is analytic that’, and ‘it is physically necessary that’; and in jurisprudence or private international law we may have statements about what it is obligatory or not obligatory to do under several different systems of rules. Moreover even if the contexts of such operators are all referentially opaque, in Quine's sense [1] of being exempt from the substitutivity of truth-functional biconditionals, some are, as it were, opaquer than others, in being exempt from the substitutivity of certain non-truth-functional biconditionals as well.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1960

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable