Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T04:51:52.561Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Friedman-Sheard programme in intuitionistic logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Graham E. Leigh
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4JJ, UK, E-mail: graham.leigh@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Michael Rathjen
Affiliation:
School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK, E-mail: rathjen@maths.leeds.ac.uk

Abstract

This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable