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On tarski on models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Timothy Bays*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA, E-Mail: timothy.bays.5@nd.edu

Abstract.

This paper concerns Tarski's use of the term “model” in his 1936 paper “On the Concept of Logical Consequence.” Against several of Tarski's recent defenders. I argue that Tarski employed a non-standard conception of models in that paper. Against Tarski's detractors. I argue that this nonstandard conception is more philosophically plausible than it may appear. Finally, I make a few comments concerning the traditionally puzzling case of Tarski's ω-rule example.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2001

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