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Did Tarski commit “Tarski's fallacy”?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

G. Y. Sher
G. Y. Sher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0302, USA, E-mail: gsher@ucsd.edu
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Extract

In his 1936 paper, On the Concept of Logical Consequence, Tarski introduced the celebrated definition of logical consequence: “The sentenceσ follows logically from the sentences of the class Γ if and only if every model of the class Γ is also a model of the sentence σ.” [55, p. 417] This definition, Tarski said, is based on two very basic intuitions, “essential for the proper concept of consequence” [55, p. 415] and reflecting common linguistic usage: “Consider any class Γ of sentences and a sentence which follows from the sentences of this class. From an intuitive standpoint it can never happen that both the class Γ consists only of true sentences and the sentence σ is false. Moreover, … we are concerned here with the concept of logical, i.e., formal, consequence.” [55, p. 414] Tarski believed his definition of logical consequence captured the intuitive notion: “It seems to me that everyone who understands the content of the above definition must admit that it agrees quite well with common usage. … In particular, it can be proved, on the basis of this definition, that every consequence of true sentences must be true.” [55, p. 417] The formality of Tarskian consequences can also be proven. Tarski's definition of logical consequence had a key role in the development of the model-theoretic semantics of modern logic and has stayed at its center ever since.

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Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 61 , Issue 2 , June 1996, pp. 653 - 686
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1996

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