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THE MODAL LOGICS OF KRIPKE–FEFERMAN TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2020

CARLO NICOLAI
Affiliation:
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY KING’S COLLEGE LONDON LONDON, UK E-mail: carlo.nicolai@kcl.ac.uk
JOHANNES STERN
Affiliation:
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL BRISTOL, UK E-mail: johannes.stern@bristol.ac.uk
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Abstract

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We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results. Given a fixed-point model $\mathcal {M}$, or an axiomatization S thereof, we find a modal logic M such that a modal sentence $\varphi $ is a theorem of M if and only if the sentence $\varphi ^*$ obtained by translating the modal operator with the truth predicate is true in $\mathcal {M}$ or a theorem of S under all such translations. To this end, we introduce a novel version of possible worlds semantics featuring both classical and nonclassical worlds and establish the completeness of a family of noncongruent modal logics whose internal logic is nonclassical with respect to this semantics.

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Article
Copyright
© The Association for Symbolic Logic 2020