Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 March 2014
The philosophical dispute over whether there are universale, or abstract entities, is not a dispute over the admissibility of general terms. Both sides will agree that general terms, e.g. ‘man,’ and perhaps even abstract singular terms such as ‘mankind’ and ‘7’, are meaningful, in the sense at least of participating in statements which as wholes are true or false. Where the platonists (as I shall call those who accept universale) differ from their opponents, the nominalists, is in positing a realm of entities, universals, corresponding to such general or abstract words.
The platonist is likely to regard the word ‘man’ as naming a universal, the class of men or the property of being a man, much as the word ‘Caesar’ names the concrete object Caesar. Actually, however, this is an extraneous detail. The platonist could equally well concur with the nominalist in the view that general terms, though meaningful in context, are not names at all.
The first half of this paper corresponds closely to the first half of the paper On the problem of universals which I read before the Association for Symbolic Logic on February 8, 1947. The latter half of this paper, on the other hand, is new. Of the remaining half of the paper of February 8, a portion will appear in expanded form as part of a paper which I am preparing in collaboration with Professor Goodman. The stimulation of the present paper, also, came largely from discussions with him.