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The work of Kurt Gödel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Stephen C. Kleene*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706

Extract

I first heard the name of Kurt Gödel when, as a graduate student at Princeton in the fall of 1931, I attended a colloquium at which John von Neumann was the speaker, von Neumann could have spoken on work of his own; but instead he gave an exposition of Gödel's results of formally undecidable propositions [1931].

Today I shall begin with Gödel's paper [1930] on The completeness of the axioms of the functional calculus of logic, or of what we now often call “the first-order predicate calculus”, using “predicate” as synonymous with “propositional function”.

Alonzo Church wrote ([1944, p. 62] and [1956, pp. 288–289]), “the first explicit formulation of the functional calculus of first order as an independent logistic system is perhaps in the first edition of Hilbert and Ackermann's Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik (1928).” Clearly, this formalism is not complete in the sense that each closed formula or its negation is provable. (A closed formula, or sentence, is a formula without free occurrences of variables.) But Hilbert and Ackermann observe, “Whether the system of axioms is complete at least in the sense that all the logical formulas which are correct for each domain of individuals can actually be derived from them is still an unsolved question.” [1928, p. 68].

This question Gödel answered in the affirmative in his Ph.D. thesis (Vienna, 1930), of which the paper under discussion is a rewritten version.

I shall not describe Gödel's proof. Perhaps no theorem in modern logic has been proved more often than Gödel's completeness theorem for the first-order predicate calculus. It stands at the focus of a complex of fundamental theorems, which different scholars have approached from various directions (e.g. Kleene [1967, Chapter VI]).

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1976

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