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Delegated bargaining in a competitive agent market: an experimental study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Amy K. Choy
Affiliation:
Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA
John R. Hamman*
Affiliation:
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
Ronald R. King
Affiliation:
Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA
Roberto A. Weber
Affiliation:
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
*

Abstract

We examine a variant of ultimatum bargaining in which principals may delegate their proposal decision to agents hired from a competitive market. Contrary to several prior studies, we find that when principals must use agents, the resulting proposals are significantly higher than when principals make proposals themselves. In reconciling our results with prior findings, we conclude that both the rejection power afforded to responders and the structure of principal-agent contracts can play significant roles in the nature of outcomes under delegated bargaining.

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Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2015

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