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Dishonesty under scrutiny

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Jeroen van de Ven*
Affiliation:
ACLE (University of Amsterdam) and Tinbergen Institute, Valckeniersstraat 65-67, 1018 XE Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Marie Claire Villeval*
Affiliation:
Université de Lyon, 69007 Lyon, FranceCNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Ecully, FranceIZA, Bonn, Germany

Abstract

We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s [Am Econ Rev 95:384–394 (2005)] deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2015

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