Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T22:47:57.618Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

From imitation to collusion: a replication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Jörg Oechssler*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str.58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany
Alex Roomets*
Affiliation:
Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, PA, USA
Stefan Roth*
Affiliation:
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

Abstract

In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (J Econ Theory 155:185–205, 2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: While they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25–50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms, none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot–Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods.

Information

Type
Replication Paper
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Supplementary material: File

Oechssler et. al. supplementary material

Oechssler et. al. supplementary material
Download Oechssler et. al. supplementary material(File)
File 509.7 KB