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Hot versus cold behavior in centipede games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Bernardo García-Pola*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, AGORA Center, UNSW Business School, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
Nagore Iriberri*
Affiliation:
Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I and Bridge, University of the Basque Country UPV-EHU, Av. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Jaromír Kovářík*
Affiliation:
Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I and Bridge, University of the Basque Country UPV-EHU, Av. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

Abstract

There is a long-standing unresolved debate in game theory and experimental economics regarding the behavioral equivalence of the direct-response method (hot play) and the strategy method (cold play). Using a unified experimental framework, we compare behavior elicited via both methods in four different Centipede Games that differ in their incentives to take or pass, in the evolution of those incentives over decision nodes, and in the asymmetry of the incentives across the two player roles. Out of the four Centipede Games, we find that both methods yield statistically different behavior in two of them, while in the remaining two we cannot reject the same behavior across the hot and cold methods. Whenever the behavior diverges, hot play consistently makes individuals stop earlier. These findings should shift the question from whether both methods are generically behaviorally equivalent to under which conditions they are (not) and why.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2020

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