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Hotelling revisits the lab: equilibration in continuous and discrete time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Curtis Kephart*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA
Daniel Friedman*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA

Abstract

We investigate experimentally the impact of continuous time on a four-player Hotelling location game. The static pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) consists of firms paired-up at the first and third quartiles of the linear city. In a repeated simultaneous move (discrete time) treatment, we largely replicate previous findings in which subjects fail to converge to the NE. However, in asynchronous move (continuous time) treatments we see clear convergence towards the NE.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2015

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